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NIGH THE WATER OF CHANGING TIDES:
COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT AFTER
LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL
COUNCIL
PERRJN Q. DARGAN,

nIr

But look! here come more crowds, pacing straightfor the
water, and seemingly bound for a dive. Strange! Nothing will
content them but the extremest limit of the land; loitering under
the shady lee of yonder warehouses will not suffice. No. They
must get just as nigh the water as they possibly can without
falling in. And there they stand-miles of them-leagues.
-HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DIcK
or THE WHrrE WHALE (1851)
The South Carolina beach/dune system is now in a state of crisis.
Over 57 miles of our beaches are critically eroding. This erosion is
threatening the continued existence of the beach/dune system and
thereby threatening life, property, the tourist industry, vital state and
local revenue, marine habitat, and a national treasure.
The primary causes of this crisis include a persistent rise in sea
level, poorly planned development which encroaches upon the
beach/dune system and a lack of comprehensive beach management
planning. This crisis will continue unabated unless the State makes a
firm commitment to protect, preserve, restore, and enhance our
beach/dune system. This resource is now in desperate need of the State's
stewardship. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Call us Ishmaels. The song of the sea allures us; its pull is irresistible.

* B.A. 1984, College of Charleston; J.D. 1993, University of South Carolina; M.A.
expected 1994, Clemson University. The author wishes to thank B.L. Hobbes and G.R.
Murphy for their assistance and support.
1. REPORT OF SOUTH CAROLINA BLuE RIBBON COMMITTEE ON BEACrFRONT
MANAGEMENT i (1987) [hereinafter BLuE RIBBON COMMITTEE REPORT].
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Dense masses of dwellings dot our nation's shores, and each new house
creeps ever closer to the edge of the continent. There, the insatiable surge
of humanity meets the uncontrollable tides of Neptune, neither betraying a
hint of self-restraint or deference for the other. Hammers continually bang
as the waves crash the shores with rhythmic and unrelenting indifference.
In 1988, 1177 people per shoreline mile populated the coastal areas of
the United States. 2 Although the nation's 451 coastal counties account for
only twenty percent of its total land area (eleven percent if Alaska is
excluded), 3 approximately 112 million people-nearly forty-five percent of
the total population-inhabit these counties. 4 And they will continue to
come.' Meanwhile, the results of this inevitable showdown between man
and nature have been predictable, illustrated most recently by Hurricanes
Hugo, Andrew, and Iniki. 6 More importantly, these results seem destined

2. THOMAS J. CULLITON ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 50 YEARS OF
POPULATION CHANGE ALONG THE NATION'S COASTS, 1960-2010, at 7 (1990).
3. Id.at 3.
4.See id.at 4 tbl. 2.
5.See, e.g., id.
6. Just before midnight on September 21, 1989, Hurricane Hugo crashed into the
South Carolina coast, packing 135 mile-per-hour winds and a seventeen-foot wall of
water. The storm killed twenty-one people in the Carolinas and Virginia, left 200,000
people without power, and caused one billion dollars in damage in the Charleston area
alone. See, e.g., Ed Magnuson, Winds of Chaos, TIME, Oct. 2, 1989, at 16; Tom
Morganthau et al., Hugo is a Killer, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 2, 1989, at 18; James N. Baker
et al., The Storm After Hugo, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 9, 1989, at 40; see also Tom Morganthau et al., Destruction inParadise, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 21, 1992, at 51 (recounting
destruction caused by Hurricane Iniki's 144 to 180 m.p.h. winds); Janice Castro, Mother
Nature's Angriest Child, TIME, Sept. 7, 1992, at 14 (recounting destruction caused by
Hurricane Andrew's 164 m.p.h. winds).

Although it is certainly true that a storm of this magnitude could wreak havoc on
even the most soundly developed shores, responsible land use can mitigate the damage.
Conversely, a storm much smaller than Hurricane Hugo can ravage a poorly planned
coastal development. "A relatively minor storm in early December, 1986, closely
followed by the January 1, 1987, storm inflicted substantial damage to upland property
($20 million) and left the coast of South Carolina severely damaged and highly
vulnerable to future storms." BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at iii.

Moreover, severe winter northeasters can pack a fierce punch, second only to hurricanes
in concentrated energy. WILLIAM J. NEAL ET AL., LIVING WITH THE SOUTH CAROLINA

SHORE 20 (1984). Indeed, "[a] hurricane, rather compact and fast-moving, is sometimes
less devastating than a slow, broad, winter storm." WALLACE KAUFMAN & ORRIN H.
PILKEY JR., THE BEACHES ARE MOVING: THE DROWNING OF AMERICA'S SHORELINE

129 (1983). "Perhaps fifty such storms were severe enough to cause some degree of
coastal damage along the South Carolina shoreline in the first 80 years of this century."
NEAL, supra, at 20. The combined specter of hurricanes and winter storms represents
a formidable threat to any coastline; "[r]arely a year goes by without a hurricane or
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss3/3
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to repeat themselves, absent a dramatic overhaul of our collective approach
to coastal land management.7
In 1972 Congress sought to abate this clash between man and nature by
passing the Coastal Zone Management Act.' Among other things, the Act
encouraged "coastal states" 9 to develop and implement "management
programs to achieve wise use of the land and water resources of the coastal
zone." 1" Congress urged that such programs should provide for
the management of coastal development to minimize the loss of life and
property caused by improper development in flood-prone, storm surge,
geological hazard, and erosion-prone areas and in areas likely to be
affected by or vulnerable to sea level rise, land subsidence, and
saltwater intrusion, and by the destruction of natural protective features
such as beaches, dunes, wetlands, and barrier islands."

Since the passage of the Act every coastal state, including South Carolina,
has responded by passing its own coastal zone management act.12 Howev-

northeaster eroding some part of the [South Carolina] shore." Id.
7. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration reports:
While direct causes of environmental quality problems are often difficult to
document, evidence is mounting that many are the result of general coastal
development patterns. Natural processes of coastal ecosystems are being
disrupted, and the ecological and economic values of coastal areas threatened.
Fundamental changes are occurring in the way natural systems work and look.
As coastal population grows, many of the qualities that attracted people
initially are diminishing.
As many coastal areas grow more crowded, the short-comings of
management actions that focus on site-by-site and permit-by-permit decisions,
while failing to address the more ubiquitous problems of growth and
development, become more obvious.
CULLrrON, supra note 2, at 1.
8. Pub. L. No. 92-583, 86 Stat. 1280 (1972) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§
1451-1464 (1988 & Supp. II 1990)). See generally Linda A. Malone, The CoastalZone
Management Act and the Takings Clause in the 1990's: Making the Casefor Federal
Land Use to Preserve CoastalAreas, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 711 (1991) (discussing the

federal Coastal Zone Management Act and cases that have interpreted it).
9. "Coastal states" is a defined term meaning any state "in, or bordering on, the
Atlantic, Pacific, or Arctic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, Long Island Sound, or one or
more of the Great Lakes," including "Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the Trust Territories of the Pacific
Islands, and American Samoa." 16 U.S.C. § 1453(4) (1988).
10. Id. § 1452(2) (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
11. Id. § 1452(2)(b).
12. Natasha Zalkin, Shifting Sands and Shifting Doctrines: The Supreme Court's
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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er, the problem in South Carolina and other affected states has been
complaints that the regulations constitute takings of private property without
just compensation. 3
Since its enactment in 1977, the South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act (SCCZMA) has undergone a dramatic evolution. The Act began
as mild regulation of coastal uses in 1977, swung to a vastly more intrusive
land-use plan in 1988, and, with the 1990 amendments, 4 has settled
somewhere in between. The most controversial feature of the SCCZMA
concerns the regulation of construction and reconstruction of dwellings on
beachfront lots. The current version of the Act vests in the South Carolina
Coastal Council a great deal of regulatory discretion regarding coastal
dwelling construction. This system is the result of trial and error, forged
from criticism and litigation, most notably, Lucas v. South CarolinaCoastal
Council.'5
Lucas II is a landmark opinion of the United States Supreme Court that
addresses a number of important constitutional issues and is subject to attack
and defense on several fronts. This Note does not, however, attempt to treat
all of the issues; rather its purpose is to trace the evolution of the South
Carolina Beachfront Management Act and to present the Act in its current
form as a model for state coastal zone management efforts. In addition,
because both the South Carolina Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court decided the Lucas case under the 1988 Act without
consideration of the 1990 amendments, 6 the Note assesses the Act's

Changing Takings DoctrineandSouth Carolina'sCoastalZone Statute, 79 CAL. L. REv.
205, 216 & n.46 (1991) (citing all state coastal zone management statutes). "Virtually
all these states utilize some type of permit system geared toward restricting further
development in fragile coastal regions." Id. at 216-17. In 1977 the South Carolina
General Assembly passed the South Carolina Coastal Zone Management Act, S.C. CODE

ANN. §§ 48-39-10 to -220 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1992). See Newman J. Smith,
Analysis of the Regulation of Beachfront Development in South Carolina, 42 S.C. L.
REV. 717 (1991).

13. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment isapplied to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897). See generally Harold N.

Skelton, Comment, Houses on the Sand: Takings Issues Surrounding Statutory
Restrictions on the Use of Oceanfront Property, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 125
(1990) (discussing takings issues surrounding South Carolina and Massachusetts coastal
zone management statutes).
14. Act of June 25, 1990, No. 607, 1990 S.C. Acts 2581 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 48, ch. 39 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)).
15. 304 S.C. 376, 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991) [hereinafter Lucas 1], rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
2886 [hereinafter Lucas I]], on remand, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992) [hereinafter Lucas

11].
16. See Lucas I, 304 S.C. at 377, 404 S.E.2d at 895; Lucas It, 112 S. Ct. at 2891https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss3/3
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constitutionality under the new rule of law governing regulatory takings as
recently announced by the United States Supreme Court in Lucas 11.17
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA BEACHFRONT
MANAGEMENT ACT

A. The CoastalZone Management Act of 1977
The 1977 version of the SCCZMA was the first step in the evolution
of South Carolina's coastal land regulatory scheme, 18 covering "[c]ritical
[a]reas" along the coast-"beaches" and "primary ocean front sand
dunes." 9 Basically, the 1977 SCCZMA required permitting for any new
dwelling construction or placement of erosion control devices in the critical
areas." The permitting process, however, was extremely lenient and
offered easily exploited loopholes. Permits were uniformly granted, even
after the Coastal Council tightened its standards. In short, the SCCZMA had
no teeth. The proliferation of homes, seawalls, and other erosion control
devices in the critical areas continued virtually unabated.2 In 1987,
therefore, the Coastal Council appointed a Blue Ribbon Committee on
Beachfront Management "to investigate the problems of beach erosion along
the South Carolina coast and determine how the beaches and dunes should
best be managed by the State for its citizens ...

[and] to propose long-term

solutions to the identified problems. "'
The Blue Ribbon Committee found that "the beach/dune system along
the coast. . . is extremely important to the people" because it performs a

92.
17. Much of the litigation that arose under the Act involved dwelling construction or
reconstruction, but the Act was also intended to phase out the use of erosion control
devices. See generally Smith, supra note 12 (discussing the SCCZMA). Although such
devices seem to offer a satisfactory short-term solution to beachfront erosion, they
actually worsen the long-term erosion problem and create a host of other problems by
interfering with the natural processes of erosion and renourishment. See, e.g., KAUFMAN
& PILKEY, supranote 6, at 188-222; Paul J. Godfrey, BarrierBeaches of the East Coast,
19 OCEANUS 27 (1976); Smith, supra note 12, at 719-20; BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. However, because limitations placed on the use of erosion
control devices have been less controversial and seem less likely to constitute a
compensable regulatory taking of property than do the provisions regulating dwelling
construction and reconstruction, this Note focuses predominantly on the latter.
18. See generally Smith, supra note 12, at 717-723 (analyzing the development of
beachfront regulation in South Carolina).
19. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-10(J) & -80 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
20. Id. § 48-39-130(A).
21. See Smith, supranote 12, at 719-20.
22. BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1 (Statement of Erick B. Ficken,

Chairman).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

5

South
Law LAW
Review,
Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [2020],
3
SOUTHCarolina
CAROLINA
REVIEW
[Vol. Art.
44:507

variety of functions, including providing a protective storm barrier,
generating approximately two-thirds of the state's annual tourism revenue,
providing critical habitat for various plants and animals (some threatened or
endangered), and serving as a healthy retreat for citizens of the state. 23
Furthermore, the Committee found that unwise and under-regulated
development along the coast contributed to the rapid deterioration of the
beach/dune system. Approximately fifty-seven miles of South Carolina's
beaches were identified as critically eroding. The Committee concluded that
the SCCZMA did "not provide adequate jurisdiction to the South Carolina
Coastal Council to enable it to effectively protect the beach/dune system."2 Therefore, the Committee recommended that the Coastal Council
be given expanded jurisdiction to regulate coastal lands inland of the critical
zone created by the SCCZMA.u In addition, the Committee promulgated
a set of "Implementation Guidelines" directing the Coastal Council how best
to exercise that jurisdiction.2 6 These guidelines formed the basis of both the
1988 amendments to the SCCZMA-the Beachfront Management
Act 27-and the 1990 amendments to that Act.2
B. The Beachfront Management Act of 1988
The Beachfront Management Act of 1988 (1988 Act) did not change the
uses permitted in the regulated areas under the SCCZMA; instead, it merely
enlarged the regulated areas by extending them landward. The "forty-year
retreat policy" established by the 1988 Act embodies the heart of the
Committee's guidelines.2 9 The theory of the retreat policy is to allow
development to occur only at a distance of forty times the average annual
23. Id. at 1.

24. Id. at 1-2.
25. Id. at 3-4; see Smith, supra note 12, at 720.
26. BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE REPORT, supranote 1, at 6-14.
27. No. 634, 1988 S.C. Acts 5130 (codified as amended in scattered sections of S.C.
CODE ANN. tit. 48, ch. 39 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)).
28. Act of June 25, 1990, No. 607, 1990 S.C. Acts 2581 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of S.C. CODE ANN. tit. 48, ch. 39 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992)).

29. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992). Although the
Committee recommended thirty years, the legislature implemented a forty-year retreat.
According to the Committee,
"[a] retreat ... will allow owners of structures sited too close to the beach

to realize the economic life of their structures and adjust their plans over a
reasonable ... time period. This retreat must be based on sound state and
local comprehensivebeach management plans, which, when implemented, will
result in the preservation, protection, restoration, and enhancement of our

beach/dune system for the enjoyment of this and future generations."
BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at iv.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss3/3
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erosion rate behind the most seaward sand dune. Thus, the beach/dune
system is allowed to operate unimpeded in its natural flexible state,
undergoing the normal cycles of erosion and accretion.30
To implement the retreat, the 1988 Act established three parallel lines:
the "baseline" and the "setback line" were established expressly,3" and the
dead-zone line was established by implication.32 The location of the
baseline depends upon the type of erosion zone in which the land is situated.
In a "standard erosion zone" the baseline runs parallel to the coast along
"the crest of an ideal primary oceanfront sand dune. " In an "inlet erosion
zone" that has been "stabilized by jetties, terminal groins, or other
structures" (hereinafter "stabilized inlet erosion zone"), the baseline is
determined just as it would be in a standard erosion zone.34 In an inlet
erosion zone that has not been stabilized (hereinafter "non-stabilized inlet
erosion zone"), the baseline is fixed at "the most landward point of erosion

30. BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at i-iv; Smith, supra note 12,
at 719-20; see also KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 6, at 207-212. Kaufman and Pilkey
demonstrate how man-made structures standing in the way of coast-line retreat impede
and aggravate the natural erosion process. Erosion control devices, in particular,
exacerbate rather than abate destruction when these devices are placed below the natural
high tide line. By keeping the ocean from going "where it wants to go" these devices
create more violent wave action, thereby accelerating erosion and increasing the
destructive ability of tides. Id. at 207-212. Predictably, erosion control devices tend to
follow development; when a property owner sees his valuable investment threatened by
an advancing ocean, his natural instinct is to employ any means possible to protect that
investment.
31. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280(A) & (B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (1990
amendment substantially similar). However, affected land owners could appeal both the
baseline and the setback line once the lines were established. Id.
32. See id. § 48-39-300 (amended 1990).
33. Id. § 48-39-280(A)(1) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1989) (1990 amendment substantially
similar). A standard erosion zone is "a segment of shoreline which is subject to
essentially the same set of coastal processes, has a fairly constant range of profiles and
sediment characteristics, and is not directly influenced by tidal inlets or associated inlet
shoals." Id. § 48-39-270(6) (1990 amendment substantially similar). In cases "where the
shoreline has been altered artificially by the construction of erosion control devices,
groins, or any other manmade alterations, the baseline is where the crest of an ideal
primary oceanfront sand dune for that zone would be located if the shoreline had not
been altered." Id. § 48-39-280(A)(1) (1990 amendment substantially similar).
34. Id. § 48-39-280(A)(3) (1990 amendment substantially similar). However, in
determining the baseline for a stabilized inlet erosion zone, unlike a standard erosion
zone, the "actual location of the crest of an ideal primary oceanfront sand dune must be
taken as the baseline, not the location had the inlet remained unstabilized." Id. "An inlet
erosion zone is a segment of shoreline along or adjacent to tidal inlets which are directly
influenced by the inlet and its associated shoals." Id. § 48-39-270(7) (1990 amendment
substantially similar).
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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at any time during the past forty years."" The setback line for all three
erosion zones is located landward of the baseline at a distance of forty times
the average annual erosion rate, but no less than twenty feet landward of the
baseline, "even in cases where the shoreline has been stable or has
experienced net accretion over the past forty years."36 The dead-zone line,
which was subsequently eliminated by the 1990 amendments, was located
twenty feet landward of the baseline.37
The 1988 Act thus created four different areas or strips of land running
parallel to the coastline, separated by the three lines. For convenience, these
areas may be referred to as: (1) the "beach area"-the area seaward of the
baseline; (2) the "dead zone"-the twenty-foot area from the baseline
landward to the dead zone line; (3) the "setback area"-the area landward
from the dead-zone line to the setback line;38 and (4) the "safe area"-the
area landward of the setback line. The 1988 Act regulated all of these areas
except for the safe area; the farther seaward the respective area was, the
more strictly it was regulated.
The 1988 Act allowed new construction in the setback area, but limited
the entire structure to 5000 square feet,39 even if only part of the structure
were to be in the setback area.4" No new construction was allowed in the
dead zone or beach area." Replacement of habitable structures existing on
July 1, 1988, the effective date of the 1988 Act, that were "destroyed
beyond repair by natural causes or fire," was allowed in the dead zone and
the setback area, subject to some restrictions.42 However, such replacement

35. Id. § 48-39-280(A)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (1990 amendment substantially
similar).

36. Id. § 48-39-280(B) (1990 amendment substantially similar). The forty-year erosion
rate was to be determined "by historical and other scientific means." Id.
37. Id. § 48-39-300 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (amended 1990).
38. The setback area would have been identical to the dead zone if forty times the
annual erosion rate on a particular piece of land were less than twenty feet. See id. § 4839-280(B).
39. Id. § 48-39-300 (1990 amendment substantially similar). The 5000 square feet
included "porches, decks, patios, and garages," id., and no "recreational amenities"
could be built or rebuilt seaward of the setback line. Id.
40. See Smith, supra note 12, at 729 ("A 10,000 square foot building, therefore,
cannot be built half-in and half-out of the setback area.").
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-300 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (1990 amendment
substantially altered).
42. Id. § 48-39-290(B). Basically, if any part of the replacement structure was in the
setback zone, the structure could not comprise more square footage or linear footage than
the destroyed structure, id., and the structure must have been moved as far landward as
possible, but in no case farther seaward. Id. § 48-39-290(B)(1),(2),(3) & (5) (1990
amendments substantially similar). Also, the 1988 Act obligated the owner annually to
renourish the beach in front of the property, id. § 48-39-290(B)(4), restricted the
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss3/3
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was not allowed in the beach area. 43 Repairs to habitable structures existing
on July 1, 1988 that were damaged, but not destroyed, by natural causes or
fire could be made anywhere, subject to some restrictions.'
The interplay between the different erosion zones, the lines, and the
building restrictions caused a number of problems. Most notably, the
method for establishing the baseline in non-stabilized erosion zones lent
itself to anomalous results. Apparently because of the heightened potential
for dramatic erosion in non-stabilized inlet erosion zones,45 the 1988 Act
set the baseline in these zones at "the most landward point of erosion at any
time during the past forty years,"46 rather than at "the crest of an ideal
primary oceanfront sand dune," as with standard erosion zones and
stabilized inlet erosion zones.47 Thus, the baseline in non-stabilized inlet
erosion zones might be far landward of the actual primary oceanfront sand
dune, particularly if the area had been subject to substantial storm erosion
in the past forty years, followed by recent accretion. 4 Therefore, a lot that
appears to be well protected by, and safely landward of, the dune system
could actually be largely undevelopable under the 1988 Act.49
Moreover, the area in which building was prohibited crept farther
landward when the dead-zone line was fixed twenty feet landward of the
baseline. Because of the nondiscretionary nature of the proscription against
new construction in the dead zone and beach area, the potential for arguably
more intrusive and potentially unconstitutional regulation became even
greater. These and other potential problems apparently induced the South
Carolina General Assembly to pass the 1990 amendments to the Act.

rebuilding of recreational amenities, id. §48-39-290(B)(7), and required the replaced
structure to comply with "local zoning and building" requirements, id. § 48-39-290(B)(8)
(1990 amendments eliminated these restrictions).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 48-39-290(A). Basically, the total square footage and coastal linear footage
could not exceed that of the original the structure; the repaired structure could not be
farther seaward than the original location; and all repairs had to comply with local zoning
and building requirements. Id. (1990 amendments eliminated these restrictions).
45. For historical evidence of the land's vulnerability to erosion in non-stabilized inlet
erosion zones, see the discussion of the dramatic erosion and accretion cycles on David
Lucas's two lots, infra note 61.
46. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280(A)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (1990 amendments substantially similar).
47. Id. § 48-39-280(A)(1) (1990 amendments substantially similar); id. § 48-39280(A)(3) (1990 amendments substantially similar); see also supra notes 33-35 and
accompanying text (discussing the method for determining the baseline in a standard
erosion zone and both inlet erosion zones).
48. See Smith, supranote 12, at 725.
49. This was precisely the situation in Lucas. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council (Lucas fl), 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2889 (1992); see also infra note 61.
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
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C. The 1990 Amendments to the Beachfront Management Act
The 1990 amendments to the Beachfront Management Act, among other
changes, eliminated the dead zone, mollified the harsh rule of outright
proscription against new construction in the beach area and former dead
zone, and vested broad permitting discretion in the Coastal Council. In one
of the most important changes, the 1990 amendments eliminated the dead
zone by altering the lines on beachfront lots. The legislature rewrote section
48-39-290° to remove the language in the 1988 Act that had impliedly
created the dead-zone line," thereby effectively eliminating any per se
proscription against construction landward of the baseline. Thus, under the
1990 Act the three distinct areas of regulation are: (1) the beach area-the
area seaward from the baseline; (2) the setback area-the area from the
baseline landward to the setback line; and, (3) the safe area-the area
landward from the setback line.
The only other outright proscriptions against construction in the 1988
Act were prohibitions on new construction, and reconstruction of destroyed
structures, seaward of the baseline-i.e., in the beach area.52 However, the
1990 Act authorized the Coastal Council to grant special permits for
53
construction or reconstruction that would otherwise be prohibited,
including new construction or reconstruction seaward of the baseline.5 ' The
permitting section grants the Coastal Council the discretion necessary to
avoid potentially unfair situations that could have arisen under the 1988 Act.
The special permit is not, however, as widely available as it might
seem. Under the permitting section the Coastal Council may, at its
discretion, grant a permit "if the structure is not constructed or reconstructed on a primary oceanfront sand dune or on the active beach." 55 "'Primary
ocean front sand dunes' means those dunes which constitute the front row
of dunes adjacent to the Atlantic Ocean." 56 However, the crest of the
primary ocean front sand dune is also used to fix the baseline for lots in
standard erosion zones and stabilized inlet erosion zones.5 Therefore, the

50. Id. § 48-39-290(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
51. Id. § 48-39-300 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) ("[N]o new habitable structures are
allowed in the area from the baseline to twenty feet landward of the baseline.") (amended
1990).
52. See id. §§ 48-39-290(B)(8), -300.
53. Id. § 48-39-290(D)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).

54. Id. § 48-39-290(A)(6).
55. Id. § 48-39-290(D)(1).
56. Id. § 48-39-10(1) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
57. Id. § 48-39-280(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992). The 1988 Act and the 1990
amendments to this section prescribe substantially the same method by which the baseline

is fixed in a standard erosion zone.
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special permit is presumably not available to a landowner seeking to build
seaward of the baseline in a standard erosion zone or in a stabilized inlet
erosion zone, because building on, or seaward of, the primary oceanfront
sand dune is prohibited.
The special permit is, however, potentially available to landowners who
wish to build seaward of the baseline in non-stabilized inlet erosion zones.
The baseline in such zones is fixed at the landward-most point of erosion
over the past forty years, rather than on the crest of the primary ocean front
sand dune. Depending on the historical data used to determine the forty-year
erosion point, the baseline may be significantly landward of the primary
ocean front sand dune. Without the availability of the special permit, a
potentially large strip of land between the baseline and the primary
oceanfront sand dune would otherwise be undevelopable under section 4839-290(A).
The South Carolina legislature's decision indirectly to limit the
availability of the special permit to property owners in the non-stabilized
inlet erosion zones recognizes the possibility of ostensibly unfair results that
may lead to meritorious takings challenges to the Act. 9 The problem with
the regulatory scheme in non-stabilized inlet erosion zones under the 1988
Act, which did not allow the special permits, was, however, a problem of
perception. If the baseline were set significantly landward of the primary
oceanfront sand dune, the landowner would be restricted from building on
a strip of land that might appear perfectly safe. Indeed, this was the case
with David Lucas.
Lucas owned two oceanfront lots, separated by one lot, in a nonstabilized inlet erosion zone. All three oceanfront lots that bordered Lucas's
lots had houses on them that were built before the Act was passed.' °
Therefore, it appeared to the casual observer that Lucas's lots must also be
safe for development and that, consequently, the state was somehow singling
out Lucas. However, the dramatic erosion history of the shoreline on which
Lucas's lots sat was not readily apparent.61 The 1988 Act therefore

58. See id. § 48-39-290(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
59. One commentator has argued persuasively that, because of the checkered history
of regulatory takings jurisprudence and because of the essentially subjective nature of the
ad hoe judicial inquiry involved, whether a regulatory taking has occurred is generally
determined by the particular tribunal's visceral sense of fairness. Andrea L. Peterson,
The Takings Clause: In Search of Underlying Principles(pts. 1 & 2), 77 CAL. L. REV.
1299 (1989) [hereinafter Peterson 1], 78 CAL. L. REv. 53 (1990) [hereinafter Peterson

I1.
60. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (Lucas II), 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2889

(1992).
61. In 1949 the lots were on the active beach; in 1957 they were landward of the
primary oceanfront sand dune; in 1963 they were once again on the active beach, even
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appeared unfair to landowners in Lucas's situation without reference to the
historical showing the dramatic fluctuation of the shoreline. And, as
Professor Peterson shows, in takings law a visceral sense of the unfair often
results in a judicial sense of the unconstitutional. 62 Therefore, the legislature amended the Act in 1990 to create some administrative discretion to
avoid potential unconstitutional takings.
Lucas was decided under the 1988 Act; therefore, the case is of little
utility insofar as current construction of the Act is concerned. However, the
United States Supreme Court's rule in Lucas 11 will be important to all
future regulatory takings cases, particularly those concerning coastal zone
management. The fate of the amended Act will also be controlled by future
judicial interpretations of the rule from Lucas I.
III. THE LUCAS II RULE OF REGULATORY TAKINGS:
VARIATION ON A THEME OF NOTICE

The chief problem with the Act is, of course, the takings issue. As
Justice Holmes stated in his seminal opinion on regulatory takings, "while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking."63 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's body
of case law on the subject is not quite so simple.' The question of
precisely what constitutes a regulatory taking requires a case by case factual
inquiry.
Observers of the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act did not
have to walt long for the inquiry to begin. The first case to challenge the
Act as an unconstitutional regulatory taking was Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council.a Moreover, Lucas provided the United States Supreme

farther seaward of the primary oceanfront sand dune than they had been in 1949; in 1968
they were still on the active beach, even further seaward of the primary oceanfront sand
dune; in 1973 the primary oceanfront sand dune ran approximately across the middle of
the lots, and the portions of the lots that were landward of the primary oceanfront sand
dune were partially underwater (covered by a pond); and by 1988 they were once again

completely landward of the primary oceanfront sand dune. Id. at 2905 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).

62. See Peterson I & II, supra note 59.
63. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).

64. See Peterson I, supra note 59, at 1304 ("[I]t is difficult to imagine a body of case
law in greater doctrinal and conceptual disarray.").

65. See, e.g., Lucas H, 112 S. Ct. at 2893; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594

(1962)).
66. 304 S.C. 376, 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991), rev'd, 112 S.Ct. 2886, on remand, 424
S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992). See generally C. Dan Wyatt, III, Survey, Nuisance Exception
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss3/3

12

ZONE MANAGEMENT
COASTAL
1993]Dargan: Night the Water
of Changing
Tides: Coastal Zone Management After

Court with an opportunity to pontificate further on the timeless enigma
suggested by Justice Holmes's famous dictum.67 "[11]ow far is too far"?6"
A. Lucas I: The South CarolinaSupreme Court, Take One
In 1986 David Lucas purchased two oceanfront lots in the "Beachwood
East" subdivision of Wild Dunes on the Isle of Palms, a barrier island
northeast of Charleston, South Carolina. Lucas paid $975,000.00 for the
lots, both of which were zoned for single-family residential use only.6 9 The
SCCZMA did not restrict development of the lots. When the South Carolina
General Assembly passed the Beachfront Management Act in 1988,
however, Lucas's lots were affected.7' According to the Act, Lucas's lots
were situated in a non-stabilized inlet erosion zone. 71 The Coastal Council
fixed the baseline at "the most landward point of erosion at any time during
the past forty years."72 This point was landward of both of Lucas's lots,
thereby rendering the lots undevelopable under the 1988 Act.73 Although
the 1988 Act provided aggrieved landowners with the opportunity to
challenge the establishment of the baseline,74 Lucas waived his right to do
SO.

75

Instead, Lucas filed suit against the Coastal Council in the South
Carolina Court of Common Pleas, alleging that the Act had effected a taking
of his land without just compensation. 76 Lucas prevailed at a bench trial
and was awarded $1,232,387.507 The Coastal Council appealed, and the

to Takings Doctrine Stretched past TraditionalLimits, 43 S.C. L. REv. 137 (1991)
(providing a brief synopsis of Lucas I and arguing that the "South Carolina Supreme
Court's holding in Lucas marks a significant break with prior cases that involve takings
issues"); Skelton, supranote 13 (examining takings suits in the context of South Carolina
and Massachusetts coastal zone management statutes); Zalkin, supra note 12 (providing
a thorough legal and practical analysis and defense of the South Carolina Beachfront

Management Act).
67. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.

Lucas//, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
Id. at 2889-90.
Id. at 2889.
See id. at 2889 n.1.
72. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280(A)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (1990 amendment

68.
69.
70.
71.

substantially similar).
73. Lucas I, 112 S. Ct. at 2889-90.
74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280(E) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989) (1990 amendments

substantially similar).
75. See Lucas H, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
76. Id. at 2890.
77. Id.
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South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial judge.7 8
The South Carolina Supreme Court framed the issue simply: "[W]hether governmental regulation of the use of property, in order to prevent
serious public harm, amounts to a 'regulatory taking' of property for which
compensation must be paid."" The court followed the United States
Supreme Court's line of cases emanating from Mugler v. Kansas0 in
holding that regulation of a harmful or noxious use of land could not
constitute a taking for which just compensation was due.8 ' Because "'all
property in this country is held under the implied obligation that the owner's
use of it shall not be injurious to the community,'" ' when the state
proscribes a harmful use, presumably nothing is taken from the landowner;
his title cannot have comprised the right to use his property in a way that
harms others.
The South Carolina court found that the 1988 Act indeed regulated
harmful uses of land and proposed "to prevent serious public harm. "83
Moreover, because Lucas failed to challenge or dispute the legislative
findings that supported the express purposes of the Act, the court was bound
by those findings.' Therefore, the court concluded that the 1988 Act did
not constitute a regulatory taking of Lucas's property, even if, as Lucas
argued, the Act deprived him of "'all economically viable use' of his
property.",

78. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (Lucas 1), 304 S.C. 376, 404 S.E.2d
895 (1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886.
79. Id. at 378, 404 S.E.2d at 896.
80. 123 U.S. 623 (1887); see also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590

(1962) (prohibition against excavating gravel below the water table not a taking); Miller
v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928) (forced destruction of trees on individuals' land to
prevent infection of nearby apple orchards not a taking); Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239

U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibition on manufacture of bricks near residential area not a taking);
cf. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (act requiring
that 50% of coal be left in ground as support for surface land not a taking); Carter v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 281 S.C. 201, 314 S.E.2d 327 (1984) (denial of
landowner's application for permit to raise level of marshland not a taking).
81. Lucas 1, 304 S.C. at 383-84, 404 S.E.2d at 899.
82. Id. at 387, 404 S.E.2d at 901 (quoting Keystone Bituminous CoalAss'n, 480 U.S.
at 491-92 (quoting Mugler, 123 U.S. at 665)).
83. Id. at 382-83, 404 S.E.2d at 898.
84. Id. at 383, 404 S.E.2d at 898.
85. Id. The court apparently did not determine whether Lucas had been deprived of
all economically viable use; rather, the court relied on the trial court's determination to

that effect.
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B. Lucas II: The United States Supreme Court

Lucas petitioned the United States Supreme Court for writ of certiorari,
which the Court granted. 6 The Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme
Court and remanded the case for reconsideration under the new rule. 7 The
Court in Lucas II tacitly eviscerated a long-standing proposition of takings
jurisprudence and created yet another new test for alleged regulatory takings
that deprive a landowner of all economically viable use.
The Court began its analysis by reviewing its checkered history of
takings jurisprudence. After discussing the origins of the concept of
regulatory takings," the Court pointed out that it has established two
"discrete categories of regulatory action" that are per se compensable
takings: (1) "regulations that compel the property owner to suffer a physical
'invasion' of his property" ;89 and (2) regulations that deny "all economically beneficial or productive use of land. "I The first category is self-evident;
physical appropriations have historically required compensation. 9' The
justification for the second category is that "total deprivation of beneficial
use is, from the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical
appropriation."' Because the Court relied on the trial court's findings that

86. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991).
87. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (Lucas I/), 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2902
(1992). Justices O'Connor, White, and Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined
Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority in announcing the new rule. Justices Blackmun
and Stevens dissented from the majority, id. at 2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), id. at
2917 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, but did not
support the new rule, id. at 2902-03 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); and
Justice Souter voted to dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, id. at 2925
(Statement of Souter, J.).
88. Id. at 2892-93.
89. Id. at 2893 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419 (1982)).
90. Id. at 2893. This second category is, however, distinct from government
regulation that merely incidentally burdens a landowner's use of his land, for which no
compensation is due. Id. at 2894 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
413 (1922) (recognizing that "[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the
general law")). The Court further noted that a regulation which does not fall into either
of the two discrete categories may still effect a taking for which just compensation is due
if the regulation "'does not substantially advance legitimate state interests.'" Id. (quoting
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). Obviously, the category inquiry
depends upon the particular facts of a given situation.
91. See id. at 2892 (citing The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551
(1871)).
92. Id. at 2894 (citing San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652
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Lucas had been deprived of all economically viable use,' the opinion is
concerned strictly with the constitutionality of regulations that fall into the
second category.
At the heart of these two categories of government action are two
similar, yet different, sources of state power: the power of eminent domain
and the police power, respectively. In the traditional configuration, the
power of eminent domain is the state's power physically to appropriate land
for the benefit of society at large. When the state acts pursuant to its power
of eminent domain, it must pay just compensation. The police power,
however, gives the state the power, among other things, to regulate for the
common protection of its citizens. Historically, when a state acted pursuant
to its police power, the state was not required to pay just compensation.
Under the common-law maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, a
landowner did not have the right to use his property in such a way as to
harm others.' Therefore, when the government proscribed such a use, it
was not taking anything.
However, this regulatory function of the police power presented
potential abuses. The state might improperly use its police power to confer
a benefit upon society at large at the expense of an individual landowner
under the guise of regulating against a harmful use.' Therefore, as the law
of regulatory takings developed, states were required to pay just compensation for improper exercises of the police power that rose to the level of a
taking.
Finally, in the contemporary model, the line between the two powers
began to disappear. States may now be required to pay just compensation
even for proper exercises of the police power, if the regulation goes "too
far."96 While the government must pay compensation any time it invokes
its power of eminent domain, the line between a compensable and a noncompensable exercise of the police power is rather elusive and is the object
of a long and fruitless search for a pithy solution.
The takings inquiry should focus on why the government is acting. If
the government is acting to acquire some right in order to create a benefit
for its citizenry, then the government has invoked its power of eminent
domain and should be required to pay just compensation. On the other hand,
if the government is acting to prevent a harm, then it has invoked its police
power and need not pay compensation. In such a case nothing is taken

(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
93. Id. at 2896.
94. Lucas 1, 304 S.C. at 384, 404 S.E.2d at 899 (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ann'n v. DeBendictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492 n.22 (1987)).
95. See LucasI, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.

96. Id. at 2893.
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because, according to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, the
property owner never had the right to employ the harmful use. That which
the property owner never had cannot have been taken from him. 97 In short,
when the government protects, it need not pay compensation; but when the
government merely creates without protecting, it must pay compensation.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, citing the United States Supreme
Court's Mugler line of cases, followed the foregoing theory by holding that
the government must pay compensation if it denies a landowner all
economically viable use, unless the government is acting to prevent a
harmful use.98 Therefore, when the government acts to confer a benefit

only, or solely to press private property "into some form of public
service, " 99 compensation must be paid. Presumably an inquiry into the
peculiar facts of a given case would expose a government regulation seeking
to press private property into public use "under the guise of mitigating
serious public harm.""0 0 Since Lucas did not challenge the assertion that
the Act proscribed harmful uses, the South Carolina court was bound by the
legislative findings; 1 thus, the 1988 Act did not work a taking of Lucas's
property.
The United States Supreme Court, however, was dissatisfied with this
distinction between the benefit-conferring and harm-preventing roles of the
state. The Court focused on the South Carolina court's treatment of the
Mugler line of cases. " The Court acknowledged that Mugler and its
progeny "suggested" that regulation of harmful or noxious uses does not
require compensation."3 However, the Court explained, regulation of
harmful uses was never truly an exception to the rule of compensation.
Rather, it was merely
the Court's early attempt to describe in theoretical terms why government may, consistent with the Takings Clause, affect property values by
regulation without incurring an obligation to compensate ....
"Harmful or noxious use" analysis was, in other words, simply the
progenitor of our more contemporary statements that "land-use

97. This theory is not inconsistent with takings law. In calculating just compensation,
courts focus on the value to the owner of the property taken, not on the value to the body
that is taking the property. See City of N. Charleston v. Claxton, 431 S.E.2d 610 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1993); Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Copeland, 258 S.C. 206, 188 S.E.2d

188 (1972).
98. Lucas 1, 304 S.C. at 383-87, 404 S.E.2d at 899-901.
99. Lucas 11, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
100. Id.
101. Lucas 1, 304 S.C. at 382-83, 404 S.E.2d at 898.
102. See Lucas I, 112 S.Ct. at 2896-97.
103. Id. at 2897.
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regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s]
legitimate state interests ' "1°4
Therefore, in the post-LucasII model, the "harmful or noxious use" analysis
is merely a preliminary hurdle that any government regulation must pass if
it in any way affects the value of private property."° The analysis is, in
short, a threshold test of the validity of the state's exercise of its police
power.
Having so disposed of the Mugler "noxious use" exception, the Court
then explained why the exception was inappropriate to begin with. The
Court focused on what it perceived as the impracticability of making the
subjective distinction "between regulation that 'prevents harmful use' and
that which 'confers benefits.'"'" The Court reasoned that it is difficult to
determine whether a particular regulation prevents a harmful use by one
party or confers a benefit-in the form of eliminating the questioned use-on
his neighbor. For example, the Court discussed the difficulty of determining
in the present case whether the Act was designed "to prevent [Lucas's] use
of [his land] from 'harming' South Carolina's ecological resources; or,
instead, in order to achieve the 'benefits' of an ecological preserve."" °7
Because of this difficulty, the Court was concerned with the "heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public
service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm."108 For this
reason, "the legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be
the basis for departing from [the] categorical rule that total regulatory
takings must be compensated. If it were, departure would virtually always
be allowed."109 Therefore, "noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone
104. Id. (citations omitted).
105. See id. at 2898-99 ("'[P]revention of harmful use' was merely our early
formulation of the police power justification necessary to sustain (without compensation)
any regulatory diminution in value .... ").
106. Id. at 2899.
107. Id. at 2898. As a practical matter, the distinction seems a fairly worthless one;
as long as the government is acting pursuant to its police powers to regulate against
harms to society, it should not matter that incidental or even intentional ancillary benefits
to society are also created. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
108. Lucas 1f, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
109. Id. at 2899. The Court was apparently concerned that under the rule followed by
the South Carolina Supreme Court a state could regulate private property rights into
oblivion as long as it was doing so ostensibly to protect the public from some particular
harm. However, it is not difficult for a court to look behind recited legislative purposes
to see whether, in a given case, a government act is in fact designed to avert a stated
public harm. Indeed, in takings cases the Court has long "eschewed any 'set
formula' . . . preferring to 'engag[e] in ... essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."' Id.
at 2893. In Lucas neither the South Carolina Supreme Court nor the United States
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss3/3
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to distinguish regulatory 'takings'-which require compensation-from
regulatory deprivations that do not require compensation. "11
Although many of the Court's "prior opinions have suggested that
'harmful or noxious uses' of property may be proscribed by government
regulation without the requirement of compensation,"" ' this is henceforth
not necessarily true. Instead of directly overruling Mugler and its progeny,
the Lucas II Court chose merely to recharacterize it.
The Court then announced its new rule, which is potentially a
substantially narrower nuisance-type exception: "Where the State seeks to
sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we
think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into
the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were
not part of his title to begin with.""' In other words, a state "must
identify background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit"
the restricted uses which antedate the landowner's title."' The Court
reasoned that a use which constitutes a common-law nuisance, or is
otherwise proscribed by the common law of a state, was never part of the
landowner's title; therefore, any prohibition on that use cannot have taken
anything from the landowner."' Conversely, uses that were not prescribed
under pre-existing principles of nuisance and property law, but are
nonetheless harmful to others, are presumably part of the landowner's title.
The post-Lucas II rule for regulatory takings appears to be as follows:
Any land-use regulation that affects the value of a landowner's property
must substantially advance legitimate state interests. If it does not, it is a
taking. If the regulation does advance a state interest, then: If the regulation
involves physical occupation of a landowner's property, it is a taking;
moreover, if the regulation denies a landowner all economically viable use,
it is a taking, unless it proscribes a use that was previously impermissible
"under relevant property and nuisance principles."15 Otherwise, the
regulation is not a taking and, therefore, does not require compensation.
Insofar as its proper place in the mosaic of regulatory takings jurisprudence is concerned, the Court's opinion in Lucas II is, like its progenitors
in this troubled area of law, enigmatic. If the new rule is narrowly

Supreme Court looked behind the legislative purposes because Lucas himself failed to
challenge the legislative findings. See Lucas I, 304 S.C. at 379, 404 S.E.2d at 896;
Lucas II, 112 S. Ct. at 2909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
110. Lucas II, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
111. Id. at 2897.
112. Id. at 2899.
113. Id. at 2901-02.
114. Id. at 2901.
115. Id.
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construed, it could dramatically hinder a state's ability to regulate the use
of land. If, on the other hand, the new rule is broadly construed, it could
result in a much more modest contraction of Mugler and its progeny. A
narrow construction would allow the government to proscribe only those
specific uses that would have been actionable under pre-existing principles
of the common law of a given state; while a broad reading of the rule would
allow for the expansive application of common-law principles of nuisance
and general property law.
Even the lone kernel of guidance offered by the Court proves, upon
closer inspection, to be of little utility: "The fact that a particular use has
long been engaged in by similarly situated owners ordinarily imports a lack
of any common-law prohibition (though changed circumstances or new
knowledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so[)]."116
In this statement the Court appears to limit the interpretation of its rule to
a narrow construction by indicating that traditionally accepted
uses-presumably, such as building dwellings on oceanfront lots-are
ordinarily not proscribed under any common-law property principles.
However, the latter part of the sentence, which states that "changed
circumstances or new knowledge" may make previously permissible uses
impermissible, appears to allow broader application of common-law
principles. This phrase, in spite of the preceding phrase, appears to invite
creative extrapolation from established common-law principles. In an age of
emerging technology, this single phrase could provide the fodder for a
future wave of environmental and land-use litigation. In any case, this
sentence will surely be the battleground on which such wars are waged.
C. Lucas III: The South Carolina Supreme Court, Take Two
On remand, the South Carolina Supreme Court, employing the new test
announced by the United States Supreme Court, found that Lucas had indeed
suffered a taking.117 The court did not indicate how narrowly or broadly
the new test might be applied or what particular uses the state might be able
to proscribe without incurring an obligation to pay compensation. The court
stated only that, in this case, "Coastal Council has not persuaded us that any
common law basis exists by which it could restrain Lucas's desired use of
his land; nor has our research uncovered any such common law principle. " " 8 The taking was, however, only temporary because Lucas had
failed to apply for a permit under the 1990 Act. Therefore, the issue of a
permanent taking was not ripe for adjudication. 9 The court then remand116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 2901 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827, cmt. g (1977)).
Lucas 11I,
424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992).
Id. at 486.
Id. at 485-86. Oddly, the South Carolina Supreme Court stated that Lucas's
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ed the matter to the trial court for a determination of the just compensation
due Lucas for the taking. "
Among the issues left to be sorted out in the wake of Lucas II is the
constitutionality of other land-use regulatory schemes, including the current
South Carolina Beachfront Management Act. Broad administrative discretion
is available to the South Carolina Coastal Council in issuing special permits
to landowners who might otherwise be prohibited from developing their
lands, and the Council should be able to recognize when it needs to issue
permits to avoid compensable takings. Situations like that in Lucas should
therefore be scarce in the future under the South Carolina Act. However,
the South Carolina Coastal Council likely will not be sheltered from
litigation for long. Under the special permit statute,' a condition of the
permit requires that "if the beach erodes to the extent the permitted structure
becomes situated on the active beach, the permittee agrees to remove the
structure from the active beach if the council orders the removal." 22 Quite
possibly, a homeowner could be forced to destroy his home altogether if
beach erosion overtakes the land." Although landowners appear satisfied
with this condition at present, when told they must raze their homes,
undoubtedly some will seek recourse in the courts. The issue then will
become whether the South Carolina common law comprises identifiable
"background principles of nuisance and property law that prohibit the uses

temporary taking began with the enactment of the 1988 Act and continued "through the
date of this Order," November 20, 1992, rather than terminating upon the passage of the
1990 amendments. Id. at 486. However, the United States Supreme Court clearly stated
that the "unusual disposition [of the case] does not preclude Lucas from applying for a
permit under the 1990 amendment forfuture construction." Lucas 17, 112 S. Ct. at 2891.
The South Carolina Supreme Court recognized that "[c]learly, Lucas has been only
temporarily deprived of the use of his land if he can obtain a specialpermit to construct

habitable structures on his lots." Lucas HI, 424 S.E.2d at 486 (emphasis added).
Therefore, because the 1990 amendments allowed Lucas to apply for a permit, the

temporary taking necessarily then ceased. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 320-21 (1987) (holding that invalidation of a regulation

that takes property is not sufficient compensation; requiring monetary compensation for
period running from enactment of regulation until its repeal); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co.
v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 653 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that period of
temporary regulatory taking runs from time regulation enacted until legislature either
repeals or amends regulation).

120. Lucas HI, 424 S.E.2d at 486. The case was terminated before trial pursuant to
a settlement agreement.
121. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
122. Id. § 48-39-290(D)(1).
123. In non-stabilized inlet erosion zones, this situation seems likely to occur
eventually. For example, see the erosion and accretion history of Lucas's two lots, supra
note 61 and accompanying text.
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[a landowner then] intends in the circumstances in which the property is
[then] found," 24 on the active beach.
IV. THE PUBLIC TRUST, PURPRESTURE, AND NUISANCE: A PIECEMEAL
APPROACH TO POST-LUCAS REGULATORY TAKINGS CHALLENGES TO THE
SOUTH CAROLINA BEACHFRONT MANAGEMENT ACT

South Carolina recognizes several long-standing principles of common
law that likely will be implicated in any future suit challenging the Coastal
Council's authority to force removal of a house that becomes situated on the
active beach through processes of erosion. Under the public trust doctrine,
the state holds certain lands, coastal tidelands among them, in trust for the
enjoyment and benefit of its citizens." z Any structural encroachment on
these lands constitutes a purpresture, which, in South Carolina, constitutes
a nuisance per se, and is thus removable at the will of the state. 126 Therefore, assuming that the South Carolina courts continue to recognize the
vitality of these doctrines, as indicated in the discussion below, any takings
challenge to a removal order from the Coastal Council pursuant to section
290(D) of the Beachfront Management Act should prove fruitless.
A. The Public Trust Doctrine: A Neo-Classic Concept in a
Post-Modern World
[1]t is impracticable to comprehend many rules of the modem
law, in a scholarlike scientifical manner, without having
recourse to the ancient.'27

Justinian wrote that "some things are in common by the law of nature;
some are public; some universal; and some there are, to which no man can
have a right."1 Although the concept is ancient, it is no less vital today

124. Lucas II, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901-02 (1992).
125. See infra notes 131-187 and accompanying text. Indeed, states "with a seacoast
[generally] have a highly developed body of law on the public trust doctrine." 4 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS § 30.02(b), at 39 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1991).
126. See infra notes 188-199 and accompanying text. States across the country
recognize the concept of purpresture. See, e.g., Yokohama Specie Bank v. Unosuke
Higashi, 133 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1943); Territory v. Kerr, 16 Haw. 363 (1905); People v.
Steeplechase Park Co., 151 N.Y.S. 157 (App. Div. 1914), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 113 N.E. 521 (N.Y. 1916).
127. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *44.

128. THE INsTITUTES OF JUSTiNIAN 67 (Thomas Cooper ed. & George Harris trans.,
1812) ("Quaedamenim naturalijurecommunia sunt omnuim, quaedampublica,quaedam
universitatis,quaedam nullius.").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss3/3

22

1993]
COASTAL
ZONE MANAGEMENT
Dargan: Night the Water
of Changing
Tides: Coastal Zone Management After
than in the sixth century. Indeed, as one writer has recently noted, "courts
and commentators seeking a theory broadly applicable to environmental
litigation have dusted off the ancient public trust doctrine from its origins in
Roman law and British common law."129 The public trust doctrine has
been invoked in a variety of contexts,' 30 but the doctrine seems particularly relevant to the present inquiry.
1. The Evolution of the Public Trust Doctrine
a. Res Omnium Communes: The Roman Concept
As a conceptual matter, Roman law recognized that certain geographic
areas existed for public use. Under the Roman concept of property
ownership, public use areas were incapable of becoming privately
owned.' 3' As Professor Sohm discusses, these areas, or "things" by their
Latin designations, were "res extra commercium" and were divided into
three classes: "res divini juris," "res publicae," and "res omnium communes." Res divini juris were things that were dedicated to the gods,
specially protected by the gods, or dedicated as burial grounds.' 32 Res
publicae included all state property.' 33 Res omnium communes embraced
"the open air, the water of a natural stream, the sea, and the bed of the
sea." These things were not "susceptible of human dominion" and,
therefore, could not be privately owned.13 As Justinian wrote:
Things common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air, running
water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea; no man therefore
is prohibited from approaching any part of the seashore, whilst he
abstains from damaging farms,
monuments, edifices, etc. which are not
35
in common as the sea is.'
129. Johanna Searle, Note, PrivatePropertyRights Yield to the Environmental Crisis:
Perspectives on the Public Trust Doctrine, 41 S.C. L. REV. 897, 897 (1990).
130. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective JudicialIntervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970); Searle, supra note 129.
131. RuDoLPH SOHM, THE INsTITUTES: A TEXTBOOK OF THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM

oF ROMAN PRIvATE LAW 302 (James C. Ledlie trans., 3d ed. 1970).

132. Id. at 302-03.
133. Initially respublicae included properties that benefitted only certain segments of
society, such as schools, as well as those things "devoted to the common use of all,"

such as roads. By Justinian's time, however, the former were no longer considered part
of the larger category of res extra commercium, but were treated under private law, or
res privatae. The theory behind the change was that property which directly benefitted
only certain members of society, and thus benefitted the rest of society only incidentally,
were not truly public things. Id. at 303.

134. Id.
135. INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, supra note 128, at 67 (emphasis added). See generally,
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Of the three categories of "things," res omnium communes most closely
resembles the contemporary public trust doctrine. 36 As Professor Sax
notes, this is the "source of modem public trust law."137 This right
appears to be grounded in a two-fold sense of public obligation: to allow
free access to waters for certain people, such as fishermen plying their
trades, and to allow the public to enjoy the recreational benefits of rivers,
streams, and oceans. One commentator has noted that the seashore was
"regarded as owned by no one, the public having undefined rights of use
and enjoyment.""' And although the purpose of the concept of res
omnium communes seems clear, the rights that the doctrine grants the public
are less clear. As the doctrine developed in English law, however, the
nature of the rights initiated under the Roman doctrine became more
defined.
b. Toward a More Contemporary Model: The English Version
Although the feudal system existed in England in some form prior to
the Norman Conquest, the invasion resulted in the introduction of a "more
highly organised type of feudal society.

. .

and the result.

. .

must have

been to give a definite form to institutions which in England were thus far
somewhat vague. ""' The new system instituted feudal tenures. King
William granted lands to the lords, who granted lands to tenants, and so
forth. Each grant was accompanied by a mandatory oath of fealty. Under the
oath, grantees "obliged themselves to defend their lord's territories and titles
against all enemies foreign and domestic."14° The King was the "universal
lord and original proprietor of all the lands in his kingdom."' The
system began as one in which the grantees participated voluntarily for

F. WARE, ROMAN WATER LAW (1985) (collection of Roman laws concerning
water). Justinian's position was shared by others. Ulpian wrote: "The use of public
streams is common to all, just the same as public roads and the shores of the sea." Id.
§ 74. Celsus wrote: "I think that the shores over which the Roman people hold sway
belong to the Roman people." Id. § 75. Labeo wrote: "If that which has been built in a
public place or has grown up in a public place is public, then also an island which is
born in a public river ought to be public." Id. § 106.
136. Searle, supra note 129, at 898 (stating that res omnium communes "include[s]
property similar to that within the scope of the modem public trust").
137. Sax, supra note 130, at 475.
138. ROBERT W. LEE, THE ELEMENTS OF'RoMAN LAW 106 (1944).
139. THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 517
(5th ed. 1956).
140. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *50.
141. Id. at *51.
EUGENE
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purposes of self-security, 42 but according to Blackstone it rapidly descended into a system not unlike slavery.' 43
Aside from the tenants' military obligations to their lords, the chief
difference between the rights of feudal tenants and those of modem property
owners lies in the alienability and devisability of lands. The tenant, or
vassal, could not transfer, mortgage, or devise by will his land. The tenant
was merely a temporary occupant. However, as the relationship between
grantor and grantee became less military and more agrarian, property rights
began to evolve, for quite practical reasons, toward a more modem
concept. 1 "
As private property rights developed in England and property was
gradually distributed from the throne, certain restrictions on the use of
private property evolved. Among these restrictions was the public trust
doctrine. Under this doctrine, certain lands-much the same as those
discussed by Justinian-were held in trust for the public benefit.
The king, by virtue of his proprietary interest, could grant the soil, so
that it should become private property, but his grant was subject to the
paramount right of public use of navigable waters, which he could
neither destroy [n]or abridge. In every such grant there was an implied
reservation of the public right, and so far as it assumed to interfere with
it, or to confer a right to impede or obstruct navigation, or to make an
exclusive appropriation of the use of navigable waters, the grant was
void.' 45
A grant that ran afoul of the public trust was, therefore, void to the extent
that it ran afoul of the trust. Although the King could grant lands beneath
navigable waters, such a grant had to be express (rights to the lands beneath
navigable waters did not impliedly attach to rights to adjacent lands),14and
6
the holder of such an interest could not interfere with the public trust.
Moreover, the nature of the public trust in English common law was
strikingly similar to the Roman model:
It is a title held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy

142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at *50.
Id. at *53.
For a thorough discussion of this evolution, see id. at *44-102.
People v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 76 (1877).

146. See The Royal Fishery of the Banne, 80 Eng. Rep. 540 (K.B. 1605); Sir Henry
Constable's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1601); see also William A. Clineburg & John
E. Krahmer, The Law Pertainingto EstuarineLandsin South Carolina,23 S.C. L. RnV.
7, 10-14 (1971) (tracing the historical development of estuarine land ownership under
English common law).
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the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have
liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of
private parties. . . . The trust devolving upon the State for the public ... cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property. The control
of the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to
as are used in promoting the interests of the public
such parcels
147
therein.
Over the next several centuries, England underwent a change in her system
of relationships between her lands and their respective tenants, but her
lawmakers, much like their Roman counterparts, were uncomfortable with
unfettered abdication of control over the country's lands. The Roman
concept of res omnium communes presented one way in which the system
could be checked. The English common law adopted this concept and later
passed it on to America in the form of the public trust doctrine.
c. Out of the Ash Heap: The ContemporaryAmerican Model
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Illinois CentralRailroad
Co. v. lllinois48 is the "lodestar" of American public trust law. 149 In
that case, the Illinois legislature had granted title to submerged lands under
Lake Michigan to the Illinois Central Railroad. The Court held that the grant
violated the public trust. In so holding the Court "wrote one of the very few
opinions in which an express conveyance of trust lands has been held to be
beyond the power of a state legislature." 50 The Court recognized the
overriding importance to the American people of access to the shores of the

147. Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-53 (1892) (emphasis added).
Although this characterization comes from an American case, it discusses the doctrine
largely as it existed in the English common law.
148. 146 'U.S. 387 (1892).
149. Sax, supranote 130, at 489; see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). In
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988), the Court described Shively
as the "seminal case in American public trust jurisprudence." Id. at 473. Shively holds
that the states hold "all the [tidal] lands below the high water mark" in trust for the
enjoyment and benefit of the public. Shively, 152 U.S. at 11.
150. Sax, supra note 130, at 489. However, as Professor Sax notes,
the Court did not actually prohibit the disposition of trust lands to private
parties; its holding was much more limited. What a state may not do, the
Court said, is to divest itself of authority to govern the whole of an area in
which it has responsibility to exercise its police power....
But the mere granting of property to a private owner does not ipso facto
prevent the exercise of the police power, for states routinely exercise a great
deal of regulatory authority over privately owned land.
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oceans, Great Lakes, and other navigable waters. Accordingly, the state
holds title to shorelands "in trust for the people of the State that they may
enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have
liberty of fishing thereinfreedfrom the obstruction or interferenceofprivate
parties.". According to Professor Sax, "the Court determined that the
states have special regulatory obligations over shorelands, obligations which
are inconsistent with large-scale private ownership."152
Similarly, later American cases have applied public trust law in
different contexts, yet have maintained the integrity of the doctrine.153 As
Professor Sax observes, although "the historical scope of public trust is
quite narrow,"" s4 the doctrine is being consistently expanded as it is put
to work for the protection of natural resources.
Thus, it seems that the delicate mixture of procedural and substantive
protections which the courts have applied in conventional public trust
cases would be equally applicable and equally appropriate in controversies involving air pollution, the dissemination of pesticides, the location
of rights of way for utilities, and strip mining or wetland filling on
private lands in a state where governmental permits are required.
Certainly the principle of the public trust is broader than its
traditional application indicates. 55
Despite Professor Sax's assertion that the doctrine traditionally covers areas
landward to "the low-water mark on the margin of the sea and the great
lakes,"' 56 if the doctrine is elastic enough to stretch to such a wide range
of non-traditional uses, then surely it can creep
out of the ocean as far
1 57
landward as the primary oceanfront sand dune.
In light of the doctrine's historical development, applying the doctrine
further landward does not stray from the early Roman ideal or from the
British common-law version. The doctrine would be protecting the same
basic uses and addressing the same basic concerns as in the time of Justinian

151. Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452 (emphasis added).
152. Sax, supra note 130, at 489.
153. For an example of one state's expansion of the public trust doctrine in recognition
of emerging scientific knowledge and corresponding changing social values, see National
Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709,719 (Cal. 1983) (en banc) (holding that
the public trust is not limited to "the traditional triad of uses-navigation, commerce and
fishing").
154. Sax, supra note 130, at 556.
155. Id. at 556-57.
156. Id. at 556.
157. South Carolina holds in trust for the public the seashore, at least as far landward
as the high-water mark. See infra notes 159-186 and accompanying text.
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or Blackstone. Indeed, the doctrine is not being expanded to accommodate
new applications of public trust law; rather, our collective recognition of the
truly delicate nature of our physical environment is causing a large scale
reassessment of our relationship with, and reliance on, that environment.
Consequently, one sees a change in what falls into a traditional configuration
of the public trust doctrine. The public trust doctrine is being applied in
increasingly unfamiliar, though not inappropriate, environs. In the words of
the Lucas II Court, "new knowledge [is rendering] what was previously
permissible no longer so."'"5

2. The Public Trust Doctrine and the South Carolina Coast
State v. Pacific Guano Co.'59 is the seminal case in South Carolina
concerning the public trust doctrine and coastal waters. In Pacific Guano
Co. the defendants owned land bordering certain "arms of the sea" in
Beaufort County, South Carolina."W Upon discovering phosphate rock and
phosphatic deposits in the tidal creeks, the defendants began to remove these
materials."' The state sued for an injunction claiming that the creek
beds-land below the high-tide mark-are property of the state.162 The
court reviewed English and American property law and finally adopted the
English principle that the boundary of lands bordering navigable waters runs
along the high-tide mark:
These are all channels in which the tide ebbs and flows, and as to such
the well established rule is, that a grant of the shore gives title only to
the high water mark .... Chancellor Kent says: "It is a settled

principle of the English law that the right of owners of land bounded by
the sea or on navigable rivers where the tide ebbs and flows, extends to
high water mark; and the shore below common, but not extraordinary
high water mark, belongs to the public." 6

158. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (Lucas I1), 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 cmt. g (1977)).

(1992) (citing RESTATEMENT
159. 22 S.C. 50 (1884).

160. Id. at 52.
161. Id. at 66-67.
162. Id. at 63-64.
163. Id. at 79-80; accordState v. Pinckney, 22 S.C. 484, 507 (1885) (following the
"well established common law rule" stated in Pacific Guano Co., that "a conveyance
bounding 'westerly by the beach,' excludes the shore or land between low and high water
mark"). But see State v. South Carolina Phosphate Co., 22 S.C. 593 (Cir. Ct.-no date

given). This circuit court order held that title to lands bordered by a navigable stream ran
to the low water mark, rather than the high water mark. See id. at 601. South Carolina
Phosphate Co. was apparently printed in the appendix of South Carolina Reports at the
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss3/3
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In Cape Romain Land & Improvement Co. v. Georgia-Carolina
Canning Co.61 and Rice Hope Plantation v.South CarolinaPublic Service
Authority"6 the South Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule that
title to lands between the high- and low-water mark of navigable waters rests
in the State. However, Rice Hope left open the question of whether, or
under what circumstances, the state may transfer the land between the highand low-water marks:
We adhere to our opinion in the case of Cape Romain Land & Improve-

ment Co. v. Georgia-CarolinaCanning Co., ... wherein it was said:
to land below high-water mark on tidal navigable streams,
"The title
rule, is in the state, not for the purpose of sale,
well-settled
the
under

but to be held in trust for public purposes." But we do not deem it
necessary or proper upon this appeal to determine under what circumstances and by what method, if any, title might be acquired by private

owners, because any such ownership would be, in our opinion, subject
to the dominant power of the government (State and Federal) to control
and regulate navigable waters. 16

In Hobonny Club, Inc. v. McEachern,67 however, the court directly
addressed the issue. Private landowners owned a plantation in Beaufort
County. When the state claimed ownership of all tidelands within the
plantation, the landowners instituted a quiet-title action against the state to
determine ownership of tidal lands between the high- and low-water marks.
The owners traced their title "in a direct and unbroken chain to two grants
from George the Second, King of England, to Joseph Bryan, one for five
hundred (500) acres dated January 12, 1737, and the other to seven hundred

casual suggestion of Justice McGown of the South Carolina Supreme Court, the author
of the Pacific Guano opinion, because he had cited the case in Pacific Guano for an
unrelated proposition. See Clineburg & Krahmer, supra note 146, at 19-20. However,
because the case is from the circuit court (South Carolina's trial court), and because it
precedes Pacific Guano Co. and Pinckney, it appears to have been impliedly overruled
and is, therefore, of little more than historical interest. See id. at 20 ("[I]t could be stated
to land between high and low water mark was in the
with some certainty that title
State.").
164. 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434 (1928).
165. 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950).
166. Id. at 530, 59 S.E.2d at 145 (quoting Cape Romain, 148 S.C. at 438, 146 S.E.
at 438) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); accordState v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 539,
193 S.E.2d 497, 501 (1972) ("In the absence of specific language, either in the deed or
on the plat, showing that it was intended to go below high water mark, the portion of the
land between high and low water mark remains in the State in trust for the benefit of the
public.").
167. 272 S.C. 392, 252 S.E.2d 133 (1979) (per curiam).
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forty-four (744) acres dated May 24, 1744." '68 The court recognized that
"lands lying between the usual high water line and the usual low water line
on tidal navigable watercourses enjoy a special or unique status, being held
by the State in trust for public purposes. "69 However, the court, resorting
to the historical evolution of the doctrine, noted that "the government, and
specifically the King of England, had the power to grant, and did in fact
grant, tidelands to subjects, who exercised private ownership."' 70 Therefore, because the plats had been "incorporated by reference into the grants
Bryan," the court held that the landowners' title
of 1737 and 1744 to Joseph1 71
ran to the low-water mark.
'
however, the South Carolina Supreme Court
In State v. Fain,72
reached the opposite result. In Fain, an action brought by the State to quiet
title, the defendants claimed ownership of man-made diked tidal areas that
had been cultivated as rice fields. The defendants asserted "title to the
disputed areas by virtue of a direct and unbroken chain to three contiguous
grants of title from the King of England."17 The grants referred to
attached plats, but the defendants could not produce the plats.1 74 Therefore, because "a grant by the government to a subject is construed most
strongly against the grantee and in favor of the grantor," 75 the court held
that defendants' ownership stopped at the high-water mark, despite
in dispute
defendants' evidence of grants and despite the fact that the area1 76
clearly had, at one time, been cultivated privately as rice fields.
The Fain rule was most recently reaffirmed by the South Carolina
Court of Appeals in Sanders v. Coastal Capital Ventures, Inc.'77 In fact,

no South Carolina case to date has held otherwise. Any speculation that
Hobonny Club signalled an erosion of the public's interest in coastal
tidelands was therefore stemmed by Fain.
Not only does the state typically own the land from the high-water mark
down, but if a landowner's land erodes, and his property line is the high-

168. Id. at 393, 252 S.E.2d at 134.
169. Id. at 396, 252 S.E.2d at 135 (citing Cape Romain, 148 S.C. 428, 146 S.E. 434;
Rice Hope Plantation, 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132).
170. Id. at 396, 252 S.E.2d at 136 (citing Lane v. McEachern, 251 S.C. 272, 162
S.E.2d 174 (1968) (per curiam)).
171. Id. at 397, 252 S.E.2d at 136. Otherwise, "the boundary of the property
conveyed would have extended only to the usual high water line of the named
waterways." Id.
172. 273 S.C. 748, 259 S.E.2d 606 (1979) (per curiam).
173. Id. at 751, 259 S.E.2d at 607.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 752, 259 S.E.2d at 608.
176. Id. at 754, 259 S.E.2d at 609.
177. 296 S.C. 132, 370 S.E.2d 903 (Ct. App. 1988).
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water mark, the owner loses ownership of all the land overtaken by
erosion.' 78 Moreover, even if the landowner obtains or retains some
"interest in the submerged land, it nonetheless may be appropriated for
public use . . . without compensation. "'7 A landowner who privately
owns lands that are otherwise protected by the public trust doctrine thus
holds a substantially restricted, if undefined, quantity of property rights.'" °
The result in Hobonny Club, Inc. v. McEachern'8' is clearly atypical.
Most landowners are unable to trace grants even from the South Carolina
government, much less from the English crown." 8 Indeed, the Hobonny
Club court noted that "[t]he plats incorporated in the two grants to Joseph
Bryan are exceptional.""8' Moreover, the rule remains intact that "[a]
grant from the sovereign to a subject is construed strictly in favor of the
government and against the grantee."'s" Therefore, few landowners can
assert ownership to land below the high water mark. Even the landowners
who can claim ownership may be subject to restricted use in the form of
enforcement of the doctrine over private lands. As the South Carolina
Supreme Court noted in Rice Hope Plantation v. South Carolina Public
Service Authority,'" "such ownership would be, in our opinion, subject
to the dominant power of the government (State and Federal) to control and
regulate navigable waters.""8 6
At the very least, the ocean is held in trust for the public, and the
waters below the low-water mark are incapable of private ownership.
Additionally, absent extraordinary circumstances, the shoreline up to the
high-water mark also is incapable of private ownership. Although South
Carolina courts have not addressed the issue, it is a small step to conclude
that the beaches above the high-water mark, although capable of private

178. Horry County v. Woodward, 282 S.C. 366, 370, 318 S.E.2d 584, 586 (Ct. App.

1984).
179. Horry County v. Tilghman, 283 S.C. 475, 480, 322 S.E.2d 831, 834 (Ct. App.

1984).
180. The same landowner would, however, regain title to the submerged lands upon

corresponding accretion of the property, under the "doctrine of reemergence," but only
if he still owned title to the adjacent land. See Woodward, 282 S.C. at 375, 318 S.E.2d

at 586-89.
181. 272 S.C. 392, 252 S.E.2d 133 (1979) (per curium).
182. Even if a landowner were able to trace to the crown, to the extent the grant runs
afoul of the public trust doctrine, it may be revocable under the principles of Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
183. Hobonny Club, 272 S.C. at 398, 252 S.E.2d at 136.
184. Id. at 396, 252 S.E.2d at 135-36 (citing State v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 539, 193
S.E.2d 497, 499 (1972)).
185. 216 S.C. 500, 59 S.E.2d 132 (1950).
186. Id. at 530, 59 S.E.2d at 145.
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ownership, are subject to substantial restriction under the public trust
doctrine because the public must have access to the sea.' 87 Even absent
this conclusion, the courts should have no trouble invoking viable and longstanding principles of the common law to hold that the state can require
removal of structures that become situated below the high-water mark on the
active beach.
B. PurprestureandNuisance
If shorelands are held in trust for the benefit of the public by the
government, then it follows that these shorelands are not susceptible to
private development.188 The concept of purpresture 89 perhaps best embodies this conclusion.
The leading South Carolina case addressing purpresture is Sloan v. City
of Greenville."9 Sloan, a citizen of Greenville, South Carolina, sued to
enjoin the City and various city officials from issuing a permit allowing
construction of a parking facility that would partially be suspended over two
city streets.' 9 The court pointed out that the city streets had been dedicated to the City and thus were held "in trust, for the use and benefit of the
general public." 92 Therefore, the streets were protected by the public trust
doctrine, and
the City Council of the City of Greenville [was] without legal authority
to grant to private individuals a building permit to construct a private
garage building which [would] permanently overhang or encroach upon
and over the streets here involved, because such would constitute an

187. But see Concerned Citizens of Brunswick County TaxpayersAss'n v. State ex rel.
Rhodes, 381 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
188. Indeed, even those atypical tidelands that may be privately owned, as inHobonny
Club, Inc. v. McEachern, see supra notes 167-171 and accompanying text, may not be
susceptible to private development. The traditional public trust doctrine, as well as the
South Carolina version, suggests that the bundle of rights comprising ownership over
these areas does not include such rights as exclusion and development.
189. The United States Supreme Court has described a "purpresture" as follows:
By [the common] law the title to the shore of the sea, and of the arms of the
sea, and in the soils under tide-waters is, in England, in the king, and, in this
country, in the State. Any erection thereon without license is, therefore,
deemed an encroachment upon the property of the sovereign, or, as it is
termed in the language of the law, a purpresture, which he may remove at
pleasure, whether it tend to obstruct navigation or otherwise.
Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65 (1873).
190. 235 S.C. 277, 111 S.E.2d 573 (1959).
191. Id. at 279-80, 111 S.E.2d at 574.
192. Id. at 283, 111 S.E.2d at 576.
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol44/iss3/3

32

Dargan: Night the Water
of Changing
Tides: Coastal Zone Management After
COASTAL
ZONE MANAGEMENT
1993]
unlawful encroachment upon a street which was dedicated to the public
for street purposes only. 1"
Although Sloan involved an invasion of the air space over public streets
rather than an invasion of coastal tidelands, the South Carolina Supreme
Court discussed the general concept of purpresture. The Court explained
purpresture regarding lands held in trust for the public before applying the
doctrine to the specific facts of Sloan. The court resorted to Georgia law to
define purpresture:
"A 'purpresture' as defined at common law, and recognized in this
and other States, is 'when one encroacheth and makes that serviceable
to himself which belongs to many,' as '"when there is a house builded
or an inclosure made of any part of the King's demesne, or of a
highway, or a common street, orpublic water, or such like things,"' or
by "'digging a ditch or making a hedge across (a highway), or laying
logs of timber in it, or by doing any other act which will render it less
commodious to the King's subjects."'"'194
Although some states "observe a distinction. . . between a nuisance and a
purpresture,"195 in South Carolina a purpresture is a "'form of public
nuisance of which cognizance has been taken by the courts of equity in
1 96
England.'"
In Sloan the City of Greenville argued that the garage should not
constitute a purpresture because "numerous [other] encroachments over the
sidewalks consisting of advertising signs and marquees" were already in
existence." 9 However, the court held that "[t]he right to maintain an

193. Id. at 289, 111 S.E.2d at 579-80.
194. Id. at 284, 111 S.E.2d at 576-77 (emphasis added) (quoting Southeastern PipeLine Co. v. Garrett, 16 S.E.2d 753, 760 (Ga. 1941)).
195. Id. at 286-87, 111 S.E.2d at 578 (quoting 25 AM.. JUR. Highways § 273 (1940)).
Even in states that distinguish between a purpresture and a nuisance, in some instances
the purpresture may be a nuisance. See, e.g., People v. Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. 287 (1863);
People v. Park & O.R.R., 18 P. 141 (Cal. 1888).
196. Sloan, 235 S.C. at 284, 111 S.E.2d at 577 (quoting George W. Armbruster, Jr.,
Inc. v. City of Wildwood, 41 F.2d 823, 828 (D.N.J. 1930)).
"Any unlawful encroachmentupon or over a public highway, whether actually
interfering with travel by the public or not, is a purpresture and a nuisance
per se, and the jury are not at liberty to determine whether such encroachment
amounts to a public nuisance by the measure of inconvenience the public may
suffer from it."
Id. at 285, 111 S.E.2d at 577 (quoting Davis v. Spragg, 79 S.E. 652, 653 (W. Va.
1913)).
197. Id. at 288, 111 S.E.2d at 579.
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obstruction which unreasonably interferes with the enjoyment of a public
right cannot be based upon custom and usage, nor can the maintenance of
such an obstruction be justified by the existence of similar obstructions in
the same locality." ' When a structure interferes with the public's use of
lands held in trust for the public's enjoyment and benefit, the structure is a
purpresture and a public nuisance under South Carolina law. Therefore, the
structure may be removed at the will of the state, regardless of whether the
structure is the type customarily placed on sites similar to the site in
question. '99
V. CONCLUSION
In South Carolina the beaches, at least up to the high-water mark, 2°°
are protected by the public trust doctrine. When private property erodes, the
submerged lands, up to the high-water mark, become property of the state
protected by the public trust doctrine. Any structure situated on lands
protected by the doctrine is a purpresture and is removable at the will of the
state. Therefore, when a landowner builds a house pursuant to a special
permit under South Carolina Code section 290(D), 1 1and the beach erodes
to the extent that the house becomes situated on the active beach, then the
Coastal Council will likely be able to order removal of the house without
incurring an obligation to pay compensation. If the house is situated below
the high-water mark, then clearly no compensation will be required.
However, even if the house is above the high-water mark, compensation
may not be required.
Not only do man-made structures impede access to protected areas, but,
as emerging scientific data show, they also aggravate the erosion process.' It therefore requires but a modest expansion of the public trust
doctrine, in recognition of "changed circumstances [and] new knowledge,"
to hold that these "previously permissible [uses are] no longer so."203
Although this may be an expansion of the precise scope of the doctrine, the

198. Id. at 288, 111 S.E.2d at 579.

199. Even in states that recognize a clear distinction between a purpresture and a
public nuisance, a purpresture may still be removed at the will of the state. See, e.g.,
Vanderbilt, 26 N.Y. at 293.
200. Excepting such extraordinary situations as Hobonny Club, Inc. v. McEachem,
272 S.C. 392, 252 S.E.2d 133 (1979) (per curiam), and even then, as discussed above,
grants by the state of lands below the high-water mark may be revocable under Illinois
Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
201. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1992).
202. See, e.g., KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 6; Godfrey, supra note 17.
203. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (Lucas fl), 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901

(1992).
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expansion is consistent with the doctrine's spirit and purpose. Just as the
Romans believed that the public should have free access to the shore, or as
the English believed that the public should be able to carry on commerce
over navigable waters or have unobstructed recreational access to those
waters, the American legal system of private property rights contemplates
that navigable waters should be held in trust for the public. In order that the
areas may be preserved for the public trust, they must be protected from
destructive uses, no matter how beneficial the use seems in the short term.
The majority opinion in Lucas II seemed to be concerned, at least in
part, with the protection of landowners' reasonable expectations of how they
might use land that they purchase. The Court therefore held that any state
restriction denying all economically viable use of land must "inhere in the
title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law
of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership."24 As such,
the landowner would have at least constructive notice that the intended use
is, or might be, proscribed, and he can be said to have purchased the land
at his own risk.
The long-accepted principles of nuisance and property law discussed
above-the public trust doctrine and purpresture-clearly prohibit situating
a dwelling on the active beach below the high-water mark.2 '5 Even if the
dwelling were not originally situated on the beach, but were ultimately
situated there as a result of erosion, the same result would obtain. The
landowner would have lost title to the eroded, submerged land, and the
dwelling would be situated on state land, protected by the public trust
doctrine for the enjoyment and benefit of the public. Moreover, if applied
expansively, these principles would prohibit the situation of a dwelling even
above the high-water mark on the beach because the use would substantially
interfere with access to the shoreline.' If the goal is to draw the line for
compensable takings at the landowner's reasonable expectations, then this
result would appear to satisfy the spirit, as well as the letter, of the Lucas
II Court's new rule. Certainly it is unreasonable to expect to build or
maintain private dwellings on public beaches.
This analysis represents one example of how the rule of Lucas II might
be applied to a challenge to a coastal land-use regulation. Although clearly
204. Id. at 2900.
205. Even if, as in Hobonny Club, the landowner were to own property down to the
low-water mark, he would still be prohibited from placing a home between the high- and
low-water marks because that use would dramatically interfere with the public access to
the ocean for recreational or navigational purposes.
206. As the South Carolina Court of Appeals noted in Horry County v. Tilghman, 283
S.C. 475, 322 S.E.2d 831 (Ct. App. 1984), title to land situated in an area protected by
the public trust doctrine does not necessarily comprise all the rights normally attendant
to fee simple ownership. Id. at 480-81, 322 S.E.2d at 834.
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the common law never recognized the erection of a seaside dwelling as a
violation of fundamental property rights, "changed circumstances" and "new
knowledge" may, in certain circumstances, make it so.
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